2012年5月30日 星期三

美國的中國專家評估中國的將來--問題還很深沉!



[基本人性品德、社會道德水準的問題,三十、五十年內不可能改善。經濟問題更是焦眉之急。]





中國文化很好嗎?

Is Chinese culture good for humans?





Thursday, May 31, 2012





逾九成中共中央委員親屬移居海外

高官紛紛把子女送往歐美, 或移轉財產





9成中共中委 親屬居海外



香港新聞組香港27日電

May 28, 2012 06:01 AM | 23043
| 0 | 37 | |

中國大陸官員家屬移民境外,被指是「裸官」。香港雜誌「動向」引述消息來源披露,中央最近曾展開一項內部調查,結果發現竟有逾九成的中共中央委員,包括子女、孫子孫女和兄弟姊妹等直系親屬已移居海外。


香港「東方日報」根據「動向」報導,大陸官方內部權威機構統計數據所指,截至今年3月底,第17屆中央委員會之中,204名中央委員中,187人有直系親屬在歐美等西方國家居住、生活、工作或已經加入所在國國籍,占91%167名候補委員中,則有142人親屬已移居海外,佔85%127名中紀委委員中,有113人親屬已移居海外。



報導還引述美國政府的統計數據稱,中國部級以上的官員(包含已退位)的兒子輩75%擁有美國綠卡或公民身分,孫子輩有美國公民身分達到91%或以上。



美國媒體紐約時報及華盛頓郵報最近連續報導指,中共高官紛紛把子女送往歐美名校就讀,或是移轉財產。另有專家學者分析認為這是中共高官自己都對中國的未來沒有信心。



Read more:
世界新聞網-北美華文新聞、華商資訊 - 9成中共中委 親屬居海外



May 20, 2012




In China, Fear at the Top





By RODERICK MacFARQUHAR




IN the heyday of the
Soviet era, Communist leaders were described by the dissident Yugoslav theorist
Milovan Djilas as the “New Class,” whose power lay not in ownership of wealth
but in control of it: all the property of the state was at their beck and call.
There was the apocryphal but appropriate story of Brezhnev’s showing his humble
mother around his historic office, his magnificent collection of foreign luxury
cars and his palatial dacha with its superb meals, and asking for her
impressions — to which she replied: “It’s wonderful, Leonid, but what happens
if the Bolsheviks come back?”




But if even a fraction of the stories about the wealth and
lifestyles of China’s “princelings” — the descendants of Mao’s revolutionary
generation — are to be believed, China’s New Class wants not only control, but
also ownership. Few of China’s netizens are likely to believe that Bo Xilai,
the Politburo member and party boss of the mega-city of Chongqing who was
ousted in March on corruption charges, was an aberration.




Why has ownership of wealth become so important for the Chinese
elite? And why have so many Chinese leaders sent their children abroad for
education? One answer surely is that they lack confidence about China’s future.




This may seem strange, given that the Chinese have propelled their
country into the top ranks of global economic powerhouses over the past 30
years. There are those who predict a hard landing for an overheated economy —
where growth has already slowed — but the acquisition of wealth is better
understood not just as an economic cushion, or as pure greed, but as a
political hedge.




China’s Communist leaders cling to Deng Xiaoping’s belief that
their continuance in power will depend on economic progress. But even in China,
a mandate based on competence can crumble in hard times. So globalizing one’s
assets — transferring money and educating one’s children overseas — makes sense
as a hedge against risk. (At least $120 billion has been illegally transferred
abroad since the mid-1990s, according to one official estimate.)




Mao and his colleagues had a self-confidence born of many factors:
triumph in civil war; a well-organized party apparatus; a Marxist-Leninist
ideological framework, the road map to a socialist future; and the bulwark of
the victorious People’s Liberation Army. Today, more than 60 years after the
civil war, only the P.L.A. looks somewhat the same, and the self-confidence is
fraying.




The denunciations of party leaders and officials by the Red Guards
during the Cultural Revolution undermined the party’s authority and legitimacy.
The party’s insecurity was accentuated by Deng’s rejection (in practice) of
Marxism-Leninism. The cloak of ideological legitimacy was abandoned in the race
for growth.




Today, the party’s 80 million members are still powerful, but most
join the party for career advancement, not idealism. Every day, there are some
500 protests, demonstrations or riots against corrupt or dictatorial local
party authorities, often put down by force. The harsh treatment that prompted
the blind human-rights advocate Chen
Guangcheng
to seek American protection is only one of the most notorious
cases. The volatile society unleashed against the state by Mao almost 50 years
ago bubbles like a caldron. Stories about the wealth amassed by relatives of
party leaders like Mr. Bo, who have used their family connections to take
control of vast sectors of the economy, will persuade even loyal citizens that
the rot reaches to the very top.




The Bo affair is not just about massive corruption but also
succession. Mr. Bo had developed a high-profile “Chongqing model” characterized
by crime busting, Maoist singalongs, cheap housing and other welfare
provisions. It was a populist, and popular, attempt by a charismatic
“princeling,” son of a revolutionary hero, to assert his natural right to
ascend to the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee at the 18th Chinese
Communist Party Congress later this year. Among the rumors circulating in China
is that, once on the committee, Mr. Bo would have tried to replace the party’s
incoming general secretary and president agreed to by the outgoing leadership:
Xi Jinping.




Mao, who died in 1976, hand-picked his successor. Deng, who died
in 1997, blessed Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao to follow him. Mr. Hu, not being a
revolutionary hero like Mao or the godfather of economic reform like Deng, did
not have the prestige to appoint his successor. The low-key Mr. Xi, a
princeling like Mr. Bo, emerged as a result of jostling behind closed doors.
Lacking institutional legitimacy and a laying of hands by an elder, he might
have looked an easy target to an ambitious Mr. Bo.




In the months ahead, party leaders will use every propaganda tool
to dissipate the damage inflicted on leadership unity, party discipline and
national “harmony” by the Bo debacle. They might divert criticism from Bo by
depicting his allegedly murderous wife as China’s Lady Macbeth. But members of
China’s New Class will still worry that the revelations about elite corruption
have exposed them to the danger of the Bolsheviks coming back.




Roderick
MacFarquhar
, a professor of government at Harvard, is a co-author of “Mao’s
Last Revolution.”






 




大西洋月刊:中國硬著陸












◎ 黃世澤


在美國有相當地位的《大西洋月刊》(The Atlantic Monthly)於五月廿五日網站上發表由專責經濟及商業部分副總編輯MATTHEW
O’BRIEN文章,以中國的貸款大降、四月份用電量下降、鐵路運輸量下跌,以及匯豐銀行所做的中國採購經理指數下降這幾項指標,指出中國經濟已經衰退,換言之,已經硬著陸。


《大西洋月刊》的分析並非無的放矢,MATTHEW
O’BRIEN引用維基解密所漏出一篇美國國務院關於中國副總理李克強分析中國形勢方法的電文。李克強指GDP可以作假,但電力用量以及鐵路貨運量是作不了假,那是可以真實反映經濟情況的數據。照李克強的分析方法,中國GDP保八、保九都是騙人。


越來越多西方國家對中國經濟預測和分析都不樂觀,中國引發下一輪金融海嘯殊不為奇。馬英九政府面對這種狀況,是否應該採取果斷態度,中止經濟上依賴中國來救的政策,重新振興台灣的本土產業,以及探索發展印度、巴西甚至俄羅斯等新興國家的可能性,這才是保住台灣不會受中國經濟風暴所波及的正確作法。(作者為居港英籍時事評論員)


 


 



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